G7 Critical Minerals Push Targets AI and Chip Supply Chain Risk
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G7 Critical Minerals Push Targets AI and Chip Supply Chain Risk

The G7 is intensifying efforts to secure critical minerals for AI hardware and chip supply chains, reducing dependence on China-linked sources.

22 Haziran 2026·5 dk okuma

G7 Critical Minerals Push Targets AI and Chip Supply Chain Risk

Governments across the world's most powerful economies are sounding a loud alarm: the infrastructure underpinning artificial intelligence, from the chips that power large language models to the data centers that host them, is built on a supply chain with a fragile foundation. The G7's renewed focus on critical minerals is placing AI hardware, semiconductor manufacturing, and Asia-Pacific production hubs under unprecedented scrutiny, as policymakers scramble to finance and establish viable alternatives to China-linked supply chains.

This is not merely a trade policy story. It is a technology story, a national security story, and increasingly, a story about who will control the digital infrastructure of the future.

Why Critical Minerals Matter for AI and Semiconductors

Modern AI systems are extraordinarily material-intensive. Training and running large AI models requires graphics processing units (GPUs) and specialized AI accelerators, all of which depend on a precise mix of rare earth elements, specialty metals, and refined minerals. Gallium, germanium, cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements such as neodymium and dysprosium are not just components of electric vehicles — they are essential to semiconductor fabrication, advanced packaging, and the cooling systems that keep data centers running at scale.

The problem is stark: China currently dominates the global supply of many of these materials. According to industry estimates, China accounts for roughly 60% of rare earth mining and an even higher share of rare earth processing. It also holds dominant positions in the refining of gallium and germanium, both of which are critical to compound semiconductors used in high-frequency and high-power applications relevant to AI chips and communications hardware.

When China imposed export controls on gallium and germanium in mid-2023, the technology industry took note. The move was widely interpreted as a preview of how Beijing could leverage mineral supply dominance as a geopolitical tool, particularly as tensions over Taiwan, trade, and advanced technology access continue to escalate.

The G7 Response: Financing Alternatives and Securing Allies

The G7's critical minerals agenda is built on a recognition that market forces alone will not be sufficient to diversify supply chains within the timeframes that AI development and national security demand. The response has therefore shifted toward direct government financing, coordinated investment frameworks, and strategic partnerships with mineral-rich nations in Africa, Latin America, Australia, and Canada.

Several specific initiatives are gaining traction among G7 members:

  • The Minerals Security Partnership (MSP): Launched in 2022 and expanded since, the MSP brings together the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other partners to co-finance critical mineral projects from extraction through processing. The initiative is explicitly designed to build supply chains that bypass Chinese processing dominance.
  • G7 Clean Energy and Critical Mineral Investment Corridors: These corridors aim to connect mineral-rich developing nations with processing capacity and end-use markets in G7 countries, creating a vertically integrated supply chain that reduces single points of failure.
  • Export control coordination: G7 members are increasingly aligning their export control regimes on advanced semiconductor technology, making it harder for Chinese chipmakers to access the equipment and materials they need to close the gap with leading-edge Western and Taiwanese fabrication.

APAC Manufacturing Under the Microscope

Asia-Pacific manufacturing sits at the center of this strategic calculus, and not always comfortably. Taiwan's TSMC remains the world's most advanced contract chipmaker, producing the overwhelming majority of chips below 5 nanometers. South Korea's Samsung and SK Hynix dominate advanced memory production. Japan is home to critical semiconductor materials suppliers and is investing aggressively in next-generation chip fabrication through partnerships with TSMC, Micron, and others.

Yet APAC's geographic proximity to China, combined with deeply integrated regional supply chains, means that G7 scrutiny of AI and chip supply chains inevitably extends to how allied manufacturing capacity in the region is protected, financed, and insulated from coercion. The G7 is not looking to decouple from APAC manufacturing — it is looking to de-risk it, ensuring that allied supply chains can function even under scenarios of significant geopolitical disruption.

This has accelerated investment in so-called "friendshoring" — moving critical production steps to geopolitically aligned nations — as well as in domestic chip manufacturing through legislation like the US CHIPS and Science Act, the EU Chips Act, and Japan's own semiconductor revival programs.

Data Centers and the Hidden Mineral Demand

Data centers are another critical node in the AI supply chain that the G7's mineral strategy is beginning to address. The rapid buildout of AI infrastructure globally is driving enormous demand for copper wiring, aluminum cooling systems, specialty steel, and the rare earth magnets used in server fans and storage drives. Hyperscale data centers operated by companies like Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Meta are consuming resources at a pace that is straining supply chains and drawing the attention of policymakers concerned about both resource security and climate impact.

As AI inference workloads grow — running AI models in production at scale requires even more hardware than training them — the downstream pressure on critical mineral supply chains will only intensify. The G7's strategy must therefore account not just for chip fabrication but for the full hardware stack that AI depends on.

What Comes Next for AI Supply Chain Policy

The G7's critical minerals push reflects a broader shift in how governments think about technology supply chains: not as purely commercial networks to be left to market forces, but as strategic infrastructure requiring active stewardship. For the AI industry, this means navigating an increasingly complex environment of export controls, investment screening, domestic content requirements, and allied coordination frameworks.

Companies building AI products and infrastructure will need to engage seriously with supply chain resilience planning, including mapping mineral dependencies several tiers deep in their supplier networks. Governments, meanwhile, face the difficult task of mobilizing the public and private capital needed to build alternative supply chains at the speed and scale the AI race demands.

The stakes could not be higher. The nation or coalition that secures reliable access to the minerals, chips, and manufacturing capacity underpinning AI will hold a significant structural advantage in the defining technology competition of the coming decades. The G7's critical minerals strategy is, at its core, a bid to ensure that advantage belongs to the democratic world.

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